which movements are able to stage events with a very large number of participants (Jones et al. 2001) . Based on this logic, scholars and activists interested in progressive politics argue that fragmentation and mobilization around speci c identities has prevented the left from achieving its goals (Aronowitz 1993; Gitlin 1996; Stryker 1993) . These scholars recommend that leftoriented groups adopt a more universalistic ideology and form broad coalitions in order to have the strength in numbers necessary to in uence social change (e.g., Adams 1991; Aronowitz 1993; Gitlin 1996; Kahn 1982; Sampson 1984; Stryker 1993; Wilson 1999) . In spite of the importance of coalitions for movement success, little research examines the prevalence of cross-movement coalition events or the factors that encourage their occurrence.
Recent attention to cycles of protest (Tarrow 1989 (Tarrow , 1994 (Tarrow , 1996 and to social movement communities and families (Buechler 1990; della Porta and Rucht 1995; Staggenborg 1998) re ects an increasing recognition that movements are interconnected. However, most studies of social movements focus on individual movements, analyzing them in isolation. Social movements are not discrete entities (McAdam 1995; Meyer and Whittier 1994; Taylor 2000; Van Dyke 1998) , and they may be at their strongest when they participate in coalitions across movement lines. Drawing on social movement theory, I develop and test hypotheses regarding the conditions under which left-wing organizations form coalitions across movement boundaries.
1 I examine whether different factors facilitate the occurrence of cross-movement, rather than within-movement, coalition events. An exploration of this question will provide us with a greater understanding of the factors that facilitate social movement power and success.
Social scientists have documented organizational coalitions within virtually every individual social movement, including the environmental (Lichterman 1995; Shaffer 2000) , labor (Patmore 1997; Reynolds 1999; Williams 1999 ), women's (Ferree and Hess 1994; Rupp and Taylor 1990; Staggenborg 1986; Whittier 1995) , gay rights (Adam 1995; D'Emilio 1983) , civil rights (McAdam 1982; Morris 1984) , and nuclear freeze (Hathaway and Meyer 1993; Rochon and Meyer 1997) movements. Research demonstrates that coalitions are more likely to form when a movement faces increased political opportunities or threats (Hathaway and Meyer 1993; McCammon and Campbell 2002; Rochon and Meyer 1997; Staggenborg 1986 ), when resources are plentiful (DiazVeizades and Chang 1996; Staggenborg 1986; Williams 1999; Zald and McCarthy 1987) , and when there are no signi cant identity differences between the groups involved (Arnold 1995; DiazVeizades and Chang 1996; Lichterman 1995; McCammon and Campbell 2002) . While this research provides important insights into the factors that facilitate coalition formation, it is limited by its focus on coalitions active on one issue, or within one social movement. It is unclear whether the same factors in uence groups to cross movement boundaries to engage in joint protest activity. Exploration of this question will not only help us better understand the factors that facilitate cross-movement coalition events, but will also provide insight into the factors that in uence protest activity more generally.
Factors In uencing Cross-Movement Coalition Formation
Like within-movement coalitions, cross-movement coalition events are facilitated by actors and events operating from two levels: those in the external environment, and those internal to coalition member organizations (Hathaway and Meyer 1993; Staggenborg 1986 ). Participation in an organizational coalition requires a strategic decision on the part of a social movement organization, and actors at both levels may in uence this decision. Social movement organizations interact with and are in uenced by government authorities, corporations, countermovement organizations, the media, and other social movement organizations. These actors, including both allies and opponents of a particular issue, may have an effect both through their actions and through their in uence on the framing and construction of social issues. External conditions, such as the economic climate, may also in uence coalition formation by altering the costs associated with participation or by creating a threat that inspires mobilization across movement lines. Characteristics of social movement participants, including their identities, beliefs, and ideologies, also in uence the decision to work in coalition. This article focuses on the external conditions and organizational characteristics that facilitate cross-movement coalition events.
I should note that this is a study of coalition and non-coalition protest events, not an indepth study of coalitions. Thus, some of the coalitions included in the data are very short term, sometimes lasting for only one event. There may be ways in which the potentially short-term coalitions I study in this article differ from the long-term coalitions studied by other scholars such as Suzanne Staggenborg (1986) . For example, identity differences may be less relevant for groups that are coming together to participate in a single protest event than they would be for coalitions that intend to cooperate for months. On the other hand, even limited coalitions require planning and coordination, as well as the development of frames and appeals that can motivate different groups (Gerhards and Rucht 1992) . Therefore, I argue that many of the same conditions apply.
Resources and Organization
PROPOSITION 1a: Within-movement organizational coalitions are more likely in locations that enjoy more plentiful economic resources.
PROPOSITION 1b: Economic resource availability has little impact on the formation of short-term cross-movement coalitions.
PROPOSITION 2: Multi-issue organizations facilitate within-and cross-movement coalition work.
Scholars working within the resource mobilization tradition demonstrate that social groups require organizational and economic resources in order to mobilize (Jenkins and Eckert 1986; McAdam 1982; McCarthy and Zald 1977; Morris 1984; Taylor 1989; Tilly 1978) . Organizations compete with other organizations for sometimes scarce resources, including participants, skilled leaders, and nancing. Therefore, they may be unlikely to cooperate with other organizations during periods of relative scarcity (Staggenborg 1986) . Indeed, research suggests that organizational coalitions are more likely during periods marked by plentiful economic resources (Staggenborg 1986; Williams 1999; Zald and McCarthy 1987). 2 However, the availability of economic resources may have a greater effect on the formation of within-movement coalitions than it does on cross-movement coalitions. Research demonstrates that organizations with similar goals are engaged in a more direct competition for resources (Minkoff 1997) . Funding sources often earmark a certain amount of funds for a particular issue, and these funds must be shared among the organizations working on that issue, fostering competition. Therefore, within-movement organizational coalitions may be more likely in locations that enjoy more plentiful economic resources. However, economic resource availability may have little impact on the formation of short-term cross-movement coalitions. The availability of economic resources may not in uence the likelihood of cross-movement collaboration because organizations formed to represent different constituencies or to pursue different goals do not compete with one another to the same extent as organizations representing the same constituency (Minkoff 1997 ).
2. Participants are another resource that may be of value to social movement organizations. I include a measure of the number of potential participants in the analyses but do not discuss participants in detail here because the idea that more events of any type will occur when there are more potential participants seems unequivocal and therefore not worth exploring theoretically.
Along with highlighting the importance of resources, research shows that organization is crucial to sustained collective action (e.g., McAdam 1982; Morris 1984) . The civil rights movement, for example, would not have emerged in the late 1950s without the organizational support of black colleges, churches, and the NAACP (McAdam 1982; Morris 1984) . A substantial literature focuses on the relationship between organizational structure and action, and the question of whether formal organizations use more conservative tactics (e.g., Gamson and Schmeidler 1984; Michels 1962; Piven and Cloward 1977; Staggenborg 1988; Valocchi 1990 Valocchi , 1993 . Few scholars, however, examine the relationship between strategic action and other organizational characteristics, such as a group's goals and ideology.
Organizational goals may in uence a group's propensity to participate in collaborative protest events. Multi-issue organizations, formed around broad ideological principles that cut across issue areas, frequently work in collaboration with other organizations (Klatch 1999; Whittier 1995) . Because their ideology encompasses multiple issues, they may be less affected by the ideological differences that often inhibit organizational cooperation (Gerhards and Rucht 1992; Lichterman 1995; Zald and McCarthy 1987) . In fact, Jurgen Gerhards and Dieter Rucht (1992) demonstrate that organizations marked by exibility and ideological pluralism are most successful at creating broad coalitions. Students for a Democratic Society (SDS) is an example of a multi-issue organization, formed in pursuit of the broad goals of social justice and increased individual participation in political decision-making (Sale 1973) . The group's wide interests inspired their participation in collaborative protests around numerous issues during the 1960s, including the Vietnam War, civil rights, and economic justice. Multi-issue organizations facilitate within-and cross-movement coalition work and create ties between individuals and organizations active within different movements. These ties may create solidary incentives for further organizational cooperation.
Organizational goals may in uence overall levels of protest activity as well as the incidence of coalition events. Multi-issue organizations may in uence overall levels of protest in a given location by disseminating broad frames and by publicizing injustice or social problems involving multiple issues. Multi-issue organizations may play a role in fostering the activist subcultures that help sustain higher levels of activism in particular locations (Van Dyke 1998). Multi-issue organizations create a pool of activists ready to mobilize around different issues and share information about issues with members of the campus community. They may serve as an important component of the interpersonal and organizational networks that facilitate involvement in collective action. However, little research has considered the possibility that organizational goals in uence levels of protest activity.
Political Opportunities, Threats, and Interests
PROPOSITION 3: A common enemy that simultaneously affects multiple constituencies or widely shared identities facilitates the formation of coalitions.
PROPOSITION 3a: Within-movement coalitions are inspired by local threats.
PROPOSITION 3b: Cross-movement coalitions occur in response to broader threats coming from outside the local community.
Most current formulations of political opportunity theory argue that groups will not mobilize unless they believe that they have some access to the political system (McAdam 1982 (McAdam , 1996 Tarrow 1989 Tarrow , 1996 . The presence of allies within the political system may inspire protest as groups realize that change is possible (Almeida and Stearns 1998; Jenkins and Perrow 1977; McAdam 1982) . However, early formulations of the theory (Eisinger 1973; Tilly 1978) suggest that groups may also be inspired to mobilize when they face a signi cant threat to their interests. David Meyer (1990 Meyer ( , 1993 , for example, convincingly demonstrates that the Reagan administration and its policies regarding nuclear weapons and power inspired the mobilization of the nuclear freeze movement during the early 1980s. Threats may include the possibility of undesirable social policies, economic loss, or some other social change that is counter to the goals of a particular segment of the population (Van Dyke and Soule 2002) .
Threats and opportunities may come from many different actors, including members of the judicial system, legislature, and executive branch, as well as from economic elites (Almeida and Stearns 1998; Staggenborg 1986) . A group will feel threatened when members perceive that events or the actions of elites are developing in a way that will prevent them from realizing their interests (Tilly 1978) . Thus, the concept of interests is central to this discussion. Groups will only participate in collective action when they feel that it is in their best interests to do so, when they feel that collective action is necessary for the achievement of their goals.
Although it is possible that cross-movement coalitions form in order to pressure receptive allies within the political system, research suggests that they are more likely to form in response to political threats. Holly McCammon and Karen Campbell (2002) nd that women's organizations formed coalitions in the early twentieth century in response to threats but not opportunities. They argue that political opportunities offer little incentive for coalition work because opportunities suggest to movement organizations that they have a good chance for independent success and therefore may not need to work in coalition. Threats, on the other hand, provide incentives for groups to overcome the barriers to collaboration. Therefore, I expect that groups will more often work around these barriers and engage in cross-movement coalition activity in response to threats than they will in response to increased opportunities. A common enemy that simultaneously affects multiple constituencies or widely shared identities may facilitate the formation of cross-movement coalitions by providing a basis of commonality among the disparate groups (Gerhards and Rucht 1992) . If multiple groups feel that their interests are in jeopardy and that collective action around an issue is in their best interests, they will be more likely to participate in an event with other organizations. The dif culty of opposing a powerful opponent alone may make coalition work more appealing.
Enemies or threats will only inspire mobilization if movement organizers and participants de ne them as threatening. Gerhards and Rucht (1992) suggest that one of the primary tasks faced by mesomobilization actors, those interested in mobilizing various social movement groups, is cultural integration. By this they mean that mesomobilization actors must develop a master frame for the protest that is consistent with the frames used by each individual group or else the groups will not participate. Organizations that do not agree with one another on basic ideological principles may nd cooperation too dif cult and see little bene t to collaboration (Gerhards and Rucht 1992; Lichterman 1995; Zald and McCarthy 1987) . Groups may be wary of participating in coalitions if doing so will weaken the group's original collective identity, threatening their basis of solidarity (Arnold 1995; DiazVeizades and Chang 1996; Klatch 1999; Lichterman 1995) . Because organizations formed around different issues, or within different movements, will have greater ideological and identity differences, I predict that it will require a larger enemy to overcome these differences. Within-movement coalitions may be inspired by local threats, while cross-movement coalitions may only occur in response to broader threats coming from outside the local community.
The extent to which issues or ideologies overlap is a matter of some ambiguity, as William Gamson (1990) points out. Whether or not we consider an issue to be broad and encompass multiple issues depends on the meaning we assign to different terms and often re ects personal viewpoints. This ambiguity not withstanding, certain issues and events in our culture, almost by de nition, cut across movement boundaries and therefore are more likely to inspire cross-movement coalitions. Rebecca Klatch (1999) demonstrates how the military draft inspired collaborative protest between libertarian organizations and Students for a Democratic Society (SDS) in the 1960s because all young people were threatened by the possibility of military service for themselves or their loved ones. Similarly, the ring of an African American female law professor on a college campus may simultaneously mobilize several constituencies because it suggests a threat to the interests of both women and minorities on campus. Thus, groups opposed to discrimination on the basis of ascribed characteristics, such as women's organizations and civil rights organizations, may frequently work in coalition.
Temporal In uences
PROPOSITION 4: Higher levels of cross-movement coalition events will occur during periods of heightened protest.
PROPOSITION 5: Events that involve cross-movement collaboration may increase the prevalence of subsequent within-movement and cross-movement coalition events. Staggenborg (1998) suggests that movement interaction may depend on overall levels of protest. Her study of the women's movement community in Bloomington, Indiana, suggests that a general social movement community is most likely to exist during periods of heightened protest: "At the height of a protest cycle, a general social movement community, in which participants from a variety of movements interact, links individual movements such as the environmental and women's movements" (1998:182-3) . Cross-movement interaction and collaboration are characteristics of a broad social movement community. Therefore, we would expect higher levels of cross-movement coalition events during periods of heightened protest.
This may occur in part because the social ties created during collective action facilitate subsequent coalition work (Gerhards and Rucht 1992; Klatch 1999) . Research conclusively demonstrates that interpersonal and organizational ties draw individuals into movement participation (Gould 1993; McAdam 1988; McAdam and Paulsen 1993; Snow, Zurcher, and Ekland-Olson 1980; Taylor 1996) . Through shared members, extended social networks, or the media, groups come to realize that they have interests in common with other movement organizations and that their frames share common elements. Through a number of routes, social networks may create solidary and ideological incentives for the formation of cross-movement coalitions. Although data limitations prevent a complete exploration of the role of social networks in promoting organizational cooperation, I am able to explore the effect that participation in collaborative action has on subsequent coalition work. As individuals and their organizations participate in collective action, they are exposed to new organizations and ideas and may become inspired to engage in activism around new issues (Klatch 1999) . Once different groups have worked together around a common issue, the organizations (and individuals) involved may be more likely to participate in actions organized around goals incidental to their particular group's primary focus. Events that involve cross-movement collaboration may increase the prevalence of subsequent within-movement and cross-movement coalition events.
Data and Methods
In order to examine the factors that facilitate coalition events, I use a data set of 2,644 protest events that occurred at nine U.S. colleges between 1930 and 1990 . To generate the sample of colleges for the study, I randomly selected 200 schools and sent letters to their libraries inquiring whether their student newspaper was available on micro lm. The paper was available from only 25 percent of the schools. I then selected colleges for inclusion in the study in a way that would ensure diversity on a number of characteristics that previous research has shown to be important in in uencing student protest activity, including the size of the institution, how selective the school is, whether it is public or private, and if private, whether or not the college has a religious af liation (Bayer and Astin 1969; Buchanan and Brackett 1970; Hodgkinson 1970; Lipset 1972; Van Dyke 1998) . 3 The colleges I selected for the study are Grinnell College, Harvard University, Illinois State University, Midland Lutheran College, Muhlenberg College, Ottawa University, St. Mary's College of California, the University of Arizona, and the University of Southern Mississippi (see Table 1 ).
With the help of research assistants, I viewed every issue of the student newspapers from these schools from 1930-1990, photocopied and then coded all articles on student protest. 4 Based on the work of Charles Tilly (1978) and Doug McAdam and his colleagues (McAdam and Su 2002; Uhrig and Van Dyke 1996) , I de ned a protest event as any action that collectively expressed a grievance, was public, and had a goal of causing or preventing social change. Therefore, the data set includes events ranging from petitions and the passage of resolutions to demonstrations and sit-ins. I did not include protests involving only a single individual, nor did I include events that did not have any apparent political motivation, such as a riot following a sporting event. I also did not include private meetings, as they do not make the group's message public.
5 I included any protest involving students from the college in the data set, even if the event occurred off-campus.
Coders recorded a number of characteristics of the protest events from each article. We recorded the date and location of the protest, the names of all participating organizations, the claims made by protesters, the tactics employed, the presence of counter-demonstrators, the presence of the police and whether any arrests occurred, and the response (or participation) of faculty or administrators to the event (see Appendix for descriptive statistics). I later went through all organization names and determined whether the organization was oriented toward a particular movement or was focused on multiple issues, as I describe in further detail below. The data set includes protest activity on the part of virtually all social movements active during the 60-year period, with education, peace, and international human rights 3. Thus, due to time and sample size constraints as well as the limited availability of student newspapers, this is not a random sample. It is a strati ed sample.
4. I was unable to obtain the newspapers for certain periods at three of the colleges. The data set is missing from 4/88 through 12/89 (21 months out of 720) for Midland Lutheran College; from 9/37-5/43 (68 months) for Ottawa University; and, 1/34-10/36, 9/38-12/39, and 1/42-12/48 (133 months) for the University of Southern Mississippi. Full runs were available for the six other colleges.
5. Although private meetings and actions by individuals may arguably be considered part of a social movement, it is extremely dif cult to nd systematic data on these events, and it cannot be done using newspapers as a data source. In addition, I did not code electoral rallies and fundraising events that may be part of a movement's activities due to the fact that they do not directly express a group's claim and because data on these events are not consistently available. garnering the most attention. Opposition to the Vietnam War and the Apartheid system in South Africa are the two single issues that inspired the most protest events. I deleted the 56 protest events staged in pursuit of right-wing oriented goals from the data set because of my interest in the mobilizing effect of threat. It is unlikely that right-wing and left-oriented organizations would perceive the same politicians as a threat to their goals. The college campus represents an almost ideal laboratory in which to study the in uence of external factors, including resources, organizations, and political threats, on coalition formation. Internal organizational dynamics are rendered relatively constant by the common environment and social-structural position of student organizations. In addition, the college campus data provide a direct record of organizational interaction. In contrast, the Encyclopedia of Associations (Burek 1994) , which many scholars use to gather organizational data, does not provide direct evidence of organizational interaction nor evidence that the organizations exist within the same organizational environment, for example, by relying on similar funding sources. Therefore, these data are well suited to a study of the external factors that facilitate organizational cooperation. Given this, we must also recognize that coalitions may be more likely to form on a college campus and must exercise caution before attempting to generalize the results of this study.
Research demonstrates that protest event data collected from newspapers are subject to reporting biases (McCarthy, McPhail and Smith 1996; Oliver and Myers 1999) . Larger and more confrontational events are more likely to be covered, as are events relevant to a newspaper's local population. While some of these biases may be operating in the data sources used for this project, I have reason to believe that the use of campus newspapers provides a fairly complete record of the public protest activity that occurred on these campuses. The fact that newspapers are biased to cover stories of local interest (Oliver and Myers 1999) makes the use of campus newspapers a relatively complete source of data on student protest. Protest events are often the most dramatic events that occur on a college campus, and therefore are likely to be covered. Several hundred hours spent reading college newspapers provides impressionistic evidence that protest activity on campus is frequently reported. When banal topics such as "Professor Attends Conference" warrant a headline, it seems likely that protest events, which are much more dramatic, would receive press coverage.
In order to more systematically explore the relative extent of reporting bias in the student papers, I compared the event coverage in one student paper for four randomly selected months with the coverage in the city paper and The New York Times. I chose two fairly active months during the late 1960s and two months from other time periods to insure that levels of activity did not bias my measure. The city newspaper covered between twenty-ve and fty percent of the events reported in the student paper, and The New York Times covered none of the events. Thus, while these data may be subject to some reporting biases, the college newspapers used for this project provide the most complete record of local campus events available. 
Dependent Variable(s)
I examine differences between coalition and non-coalition protest events, with particular interest in events involving cross-movement coalitions. I coded protest events into three categories: those involving no coalitions; those involving coalitions among organizations within a single social movement; and those with cross-movement coalitions. I de ned a cross-movement coalition as an event that included the participation of groups organized around different 6. I also examined the possibility of another potential reporting bias issue. The presence of organizations is a key component of my analysis, yet newspapers sometimes fail to report the names of organizations. Therefore, I ran all of the analyses presented here on a sample which included only events with reported organizational participants. All of the results were consistent with those I present here.
single movements or issues. For example, if the Gay Students Alliance and the Committee on Central America participated in an event together, I considered it a cross-movement coalition.
The de nition of cross-movement coalitions required that I classify organizations according to the primary issue around which they were organized.
7 I coded each organization as being associated with a particular social movement based on its name. For example, I assumed that the Gay Students Alliance was organized primarily around gay and lesbian rights issues. I coded organizations with broad goals that involve numerous social issues as multi-issue movement organizations. For example, Students for a Democratic Society (SDS), as is evident by its name and history, was not formed with the goal of pursuing social change around a single issue, and therefore I coded it as a multi-issue organization. The South Africa Solidarity Committee, on the other hand, was clearly formed with a focus on a speci c goal or issue. I did not include multi-issue movement organizations in the de nition of cross-movement coalitions. If the only two organizations involved in an event were SDS and the Student Peace Association, for example, I did not code this as a cross-movement coalition event since SDS was not af liated with a single social movement. Ideological or identity differences would not need to be overcome for SDS to engage in peace movement activism. Cross-movement organizational coalitions have been common on college campuses since the 1960s. Low levels of coalition work prior to 1960 partially re ect relatively low levels of any social movement activity on campus (see Figure 1) . 9 Approximately ten percent of the protest events in this data set involve cross-movement coalitions, and they are most likely to occur during periods of heightened protest. Fourteen percent of the events involve withinmovement coalitions.
Harvard University was the most active school among those in the data set, with the highest number of protest events and cross-movement coalition events (see Table 2 and Figure 2) . While the number of events at Harvard seems unusually high, it is consistent with the results of prior research. Larger and more elite schools tend to have higher levels of protest activity (Bayer and Astin 1969; Buchanan and Brackett 1970; Hodgkinson 1970; Lipset 1972; Van Dyke 1998) . The variation in the number of cross-movement coalition events across the different locations demonstrates that these events are more likely in some locations than in others. The size of the school clearly matters, as the three largest schools, Harvard, the University of Arizona, and Illinois State, had the most cross-movement coalition events. However, Harvard is unique in its high level of protest activity, which may be due to its elite status and student culture.
The discrepancy in the number of cross-movement coalition events at different schools raises some concern about the validity of the analysis for the non-Harvard schools. I am able 7. A number of scholars have pointed out that social movements are not discrete entities (McAdam 1995; Taylor 2000; Van Dyke 1998) , and, therefore, it could be argued that it is inaccurate to classify organizations as being associated with a single social movement. However, not only does this classi cation re ect the overwhelmingly common practice in the social sciences, it also can be justi ed based on the fact that organizations cannot be active around all issues. Because people and organizations have limited time and resources, they have to focus their energy on a limited set of goals. By using the organization's name to classify its movement association, I have assumed that organizations name themselves based on their priority issue and/or constituency.
8. I also chose not to include coalitions between multi-issue organizations and a single other organization as crossmovement coalition events because I wanted a conservative measure of cross-movement coalition events. Because I hypothesize that multi-issue organizations facilitate the formation of cross-movement coalitions, including multi-issue organizations more liberally in the cross-movement coalition measure would have greatly increased the likelihood of my nding a positive association between the presence of a multi-issue organization on campus and the frequency of cross-movement coalitions. By using a more restricted measure of cross-movement coalitions, I increase the robustness of the ndings.
9. Because the low number of cross-movement coalition events prior to 1965 may be in uencing the results, I ran a series of running regression models wherein I sequentially deleted a year of data beginning with 1930 (as suggested by Isaac and Grif n 1989) . Each subsequent model deleted an additional year of data, until the data set included only events from . The results of these models were entirely consistent with those I present here, although the coef cients for the "threat" variables became of greater magnitude starting in the 1950s, suggesting that protesters responded to threats produced by authorities to a greater extent starting in the mid-1950s. 
Figure 2
Cross-Movement Coalition Events by School, 1930 School, -1990 to address these concerns in two ways. First, I include variables measuring the size of the school and level of nancial resources in all of the models. In addition, I deleted the Harvard events from the data set and re-ran all of the statistical analyses; the results were generally consistent with the ndings I present here. The predominant cross-movement coalitions on campus during the 60-year period were between peace movement and black student groups, and between women's and black student groups. From 1969 onward, the number of issues around which students protested multiplied; however, organizational coalitions remained fairly stable. The 1960s saw the emergence of the second wave of women's activism in the United States; the mobilization of a gay and lesbian movement; an international human rights movement, including protests against the Apartheid system in South Africa; and increased environmental activism. 10 In spite of the increased number of issues generating protest activity nationally and on campus, peace movement organizations and black student organizations continued to work together, and women's and black student organizations also continued to collaborate. The stability of these coalitions suggests that qualities of the issues and grievances in uence which groups will work together.
Women's and minority organizations often worked together in pursuit of goals that were in the interests of multiple constituencies. For example, in May 1983, a coalition of student groups at Harvard united to ght for the publication of minority student and women's events in the of cial Freshman Week calendar. A diverse group of organizations participated, including the Black Student Association, the Chicano Student Association, the Asian American Association, the Radcliffe Union of Students (a women's organization), and the Women's Center. Overlapping frames and interests in uenced their collaboration. Similarly, peace and black student organizations worked together in pursuit of similar goals and on the basis of a similar ideological orientation.
Independent Variables
I include several variables in the analysis to evaluate hypotheses derived from resource mobilization theory regarding the mobilizing effect of resources and organization. In order to examine the effect of resource availability on coalition formation, I include a yearly measure of 10. As Tarrow (1996) argues, the number of issues receiving attention increases during the course of a protest cycle. Also, it is interesting to note that levels of protest have remained fairly high through the 1970s and 1980s. Contrary to popular belief, after the 1960s, college students continued to engage in protest activity around a variety of issues. the school's revenue.
11 Colleges provide funding to student organizations, and schools with higher levels of revenue will be able to fund more student organizations. This variable is a yearly measure of the school's revenue per one thousand students.
12 I gathered these data from a college guide, American Universities and Colleges.
13 I expect that when resources are more plentiful there will be a greater likelihood of within-movement coalitions, but that resources will have little impact on cross-movement coalitions since organizations from different movements are in less direct competition for resources (Propositions 1a and 1b) .
Another hypothesis derived from resource mobilization theory considers the effect of organizational goals on movement action. Multi-issue movement organizations, such as SDS, may facilitate coalition work and foster a higher overall level of protest in a given location (Proposition 2). Multi-issue movement organizations participated in approximately 15 percent of the events in the data set and were active around a diverse set of issues. I include two variables to measure the in uence of multi-issue organizations. One variable is in the form of a dummy, assigned a value of one if the event involved a multi-issue organization. As described above, multi-issue organizations are those with a broad, multi-issue ideology. A second variable measures recent multi-issue organization activity on the campus. This variable is also in the form of a dummy with a value of one when a multi-issue organization was involved in any of the previous ve events on the campus.
Some constituencies are more likely to work together than others due to overlapping interests or frames; therefore, I include variables measuring the participation of organizations from different social movements. Using the organizational issue codes described above, I created a series of dummy variables measuring the presence of a movement organization at an event. For example, if a women's organization participated in an event, the dummy for a women's organization has a value of one. I selected which organizations to include in the analysis using inductive methods, based on the historic data and on a series of bivariate analyses. I include a variable measuring the participation of a peace, women's, gay rights, civil rights, anti-apartheid or labor movement organization, or the presence of a political party organization such as the Young Democrats.
14 Campus organizations, such as the student council, and a number of other ethnic student groups form the omitted category.
15
The analyses include several variables to examine whether threats produced by elite antagonists inspire mobilization, based on political opportunity theory (Goldstone and Tilly 2001; Tilly 1978) . I include variables to measure threats occurring at both national and local levels. The models include two measures of local threats: the actions of the university administration in response to the previous protest event; and, the presence of counter-demonstrators at the previous event. I expect that a negative response from local authorities will inspire withinmovement mobilization (Proposition 3a), and therefore include a dummy variable measuring 11. I also ran models including a squared term for resources to see whether the relationship is non-linear. The squared term was non-signi cant, and therefore I don't include it in the models presented here.
12. The variable is operationalized as operating revenues per student in thousands in order to produce coef cients that could be more easily interpreted.
13. Although the guide was published consistently every four years between 1928 and 1990, operating revenue data were not available for some schools until 1932, 1936, or 1940 . Because I did not want to assume that later revenue levels were present throughout the early missing years, I deleted a small number of events from the data set due to missing data. For later years in which data were not available, I interpolated by averaging the difference between the years for which data were available.
14. On the basis of the historic information and bivariate analyses, I determined which types of organizations were most active. I ran all of the models I present in the article including only one variable measuring the presence of an organization representing a particular social movement. I include in the analyses I present here those variables that were statistically signi cant in any of the bivariate analyses. In other words, if the dummy variable for a movement was signi cant in a bivariate analysis predicting any type of protest event, I include that variable in the models I present here.
15. Student Councils have historically been highly involved in campus protest. On the Muhlenberg College campus, for example, the Student Council sponsored most of the protest events, including events organized in opposition to the Vietnam War, in support of civil rights, and in support of the United Farm Workers' lettuce boycott.
whether the college or university administration had a negative reaction to the previous event.
16 Negative reactions include issuing a critical statement to the press or imposing punitive sanctions upon student activists. Political opportunity theory also suggests that allies within the administration may inspire protest, and this variable allows me to examine these competing hypotheses. A second dummy variable is solely a measure of threat, and consists of a dummy variable coded one when counter-demonstrators were present at the previous event.
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I also include a variable to measure the presence of elite antagonists at the national level. This variable is a dummy coded one when there was a Republican presidential administration, consistent with previous research that considers Democrats allies of the left and demonstrates that Republicans in the White House may trigger protest activity (Meyer 1990 (Meyer , 1993 Soule et al. 1999; Van Dyke 2003) . In the U.S., social scientists have demonstrated that Democrats tend to be more supportive of civil rights policies (Browning, Marshall, and Tabb 1980; Button 1989; Santoro 1995) , and certain women's movement initiatives (Sorensen 1994) . Although obviously not all Democrats are friends of the left or speci c left-oriented social movements, V. O. Key (1964) demonstrates that Democrats have consistently been allies of the left while Republicans have aligned themselves with business and elite interests since 1896. I expect the presence of an elite antagonist at the national level to be associated with an increased likelihood of a cross-movement coalition event (Proposition 3b); however, it is also possible that elite allies will inspire coalition protest.
18
The analyses include two variables to measure temporal effects. Broad social movement communities exist during cycles of protest (Staggenborg 1998) , and therefore multi-issue coalitions may be more likely during these periods as well (Proposition 4). I include a dummy variable to represent the 1960s cycle of protest. This variable has a value of one for the years 1965 through 1973. Once divergent groups have mobilized in response to a common enemy or around issues which cut across movement boundaries, they are more likely to work together in support of single issues (Proposition 5). Therefore, I include a second temporal variable in the form of a dummy variable assigned a value of one if one of the previous ve events involved a cross-movement coalition. I predict that both temporal variables will have a positive effect on the incidence of within-and cross-movement coalition events.
Finally, the models include a variable to control for the size of the population in each location over time. Locations with a larger population are more likely to have a critical mass of individuals interested in participation (Oliver and Marwell 1988; Van Dyke 1998) . Therefore, I include a variable measuring the number of students on campus in each year. 19 It is likely that all forms of protest activity, including single and cross-movement coalitions, will be more frequent in locations with a higher number of potential participants. I collected these data from American Universities and Colleges. 20 16. If two events occurred on the same day, the variable for both events refers to the administration's response to the event on the previous day.
17. I also ran models including two other variables measuring conditions that may inspire mobilization. One variable measures whether right-wing organizations participated in any of the previous ve events. The second variable measures whether the police were present at the previous event. Neither variable was statistically signi cant in any models, and therefore I do not include them in the models I present here.
18. I also ran models where President Johnson was coded as an antagonist due to his support for the Vietnam War. The results of these models were consistent with the models presented here, although the coef cient for elite antagonist was of reduced magnitude. In the article, I present models where Johnson is coded as an ally because Johnson is not a straightforward antagonist for the left, given his support of African American civil rights. I would not expect Johnson to inspire cross-movement coalitions to the same extent as certain Republican presidents who were much less supportive of left-oriented social agendas.
19. I also ran models including a squared term for the number of students to test whether the relationship is nonlinear. Because the squared term was not signi cant, I do not include it in the models I present here. 20. For years in which it was not published, I interpolated the number of students by averaging the difference between the years for which I do have data. Because I was unable to obtain the 1928 edition of the guide, I used 1932 values for 1930 and 1931.
Analytic Strategy
I use event history models to evaluate the factors in uencing the likelihood of withinand cross-movement coalition events. Speci cally, I employ Fixed Effects Partial Likelihood analysis, a variant of proportional hazards regression (Allison 1995) . Proportional hazards regression calculates the likelihood that an event will occur at any given point in time. A positive coef cient indicates that the variable increases the likelihood that a protest event will occur at any given moment, and a negative sign indicates that the factor makes a protest event less likely. The model can be represented as:
Proportional hazards regression has several features that make it suitable for examining this question. Event history methods are generally appropriate because they take the timing of events into account. Thus, it is easy to examine the in uence of time-varying factors (such as the number of students on campus) on the incidence of events.
21 Proportional hazards regression has an advantage over other event history methods in that it does not require a speci cation of a particular relationship between the events and time. Because I have little reason for believing that time, over the course of 60 years, in uences the incidence of protest activity in a particular way, this method produces more accurate estimates.
I use xed effects methods because of the nature of my data: multiple events occur within each location over time. Therefore, it is highly likely that unmeasured attributes of the different locations in uence the frequency of protest events in that location. A xed effects model takes into account and controls for the in uence of the location or any unmeasured quality of the location. Therefore, although the models I present in this article do not include controls for unique college characteristics that do not vary over time, such as the character of the student culture or the intellectual climate, these factors are implicitly controlled for. Since each college is located in a different state, the xed effects model also controls for any unmeasured attribute of the state that might in uence levels of protest.
The different protest forms, those involving no coalition and those involving coalitions, exist as competing risks. At any given point in time, a protest event may occur without the involvement of an organizational coalition, with the involvement of a within-movement coalition (organizations working on the same issue), or with a cross-movement coalition (collaboration between organizations formed around different issues). Thus, following Paul Allison's (1995) suggestion, I run four separate statistical models to examine the factors that in uence the occurrence of cross-movement coalitions. The separate models produce estimates of the factors associated with each different event type, and allow for a comparison of coef cients across event forms.
In model 1, I analyze the likelihood of any event occurring. Key variables of interest in this model include the activity level of multi-issue organizations and the prevalence of crossmovement coalitions. All of the colleges in the data set experienced at least one protest event, and therefore none of the schools is fully censored. However, each college does have one censored record measuring the time between the last protest event and the end of the data collection period.
I then run three additional models in which each possible event form serves as the dependent variable while the other event forms are censored. Thus, one model analyzes the likelihood of a non-coalition event occurring and considers within-movement and crossmovement coalition events to be censored. This model is not interesting theoretically, but it 21. I should note that the analyses do not include time-varying independent variables, technically speaking. I am able to measure variation over time in the sense that independent variables are measured for the year in which the protest event occurred. However, due to the complicated structure of the data set, I am not able to use independent variables that vary over time in periods without protest activity.
serves as a contrast with the two coalition event models. More relevant theoretically are models 3 and 4, with within-movement coalition events and cross-movement coalition events as dependent variables. I predict that nancial resources will have a larger (positive) effect on the incidence of within-movement coalitions than they will on cross-movement events. Further, I predict that the threats produced by national elite antagonists will have a positive effect on cross-movement coalition events, and that local threats will trigger within-movement coalition events. Multi-issue movement organizations may play a role in facilitating all forms of protest activity.
Throughout the discussion of the event history ndings, I provide illustrative examples taken primarily from Harvard University. I use protest events from Harvard as examples for two reasons. First, Harvard was the most active campus among those I studied. Therefore, it is a good source of examples of cross-movement coalition work. Second, the use of examples from one university provides coherence and historical continuity to the discussion. Rather than presenting a disjointed series of examples, I use those from one university to provide a picture of the history of protest in that location and to give a sense of the interrelationship among the different factors in uencing coalition work.
Findings: In uences on College Student Protest
Model 1 predicts the likelihood of any type of protest event occurring (see Table 3 , Model 1). I hypothesized that levels of coalition work and the activity of multi-issue movement organizations would generate higher overall levels of protest activity. The results do not support the hypothesis that coalition events have a positive effect on overall levels of protest; the coef cient measuring recent cross-movement coalition events is non-signi cant and is in the direction opposite of that predicted (Proposition 5).
The activity level of multi-issue organizations, such as SDS, has a signi cant positive effect on the likelihood of any protest event occurring, as expected (Proposition 2). The presence of an active multi-issue organization on campus is associated with an 11 percent higher likelihood of a protest event occurring at any given point in time. These ndings suggest that multi-issue organizations foster high levels of protest through their own activity around numerous issues and by disseminating information about various social justice issues to the wider campus community.
The presence of multi-issue organizations may help explain the high levels of protest activity at Harvard University. For example, from 1941 to 1962, the Harvard Liberal Union was active on campus, protesting a variety of issues. They demonstrated against U.S. involvement in World War II, fought for tenants' rights and organized labor during the 1940s, staged one of the rst civil rights protests on campus in the 1940s, opposed the presence of ROTC on campus during the 1950s and early 1960s, and were one of the only student organizations in the country to protest the McCarthy hearings and loyalty oaths of the 1950s. In the early 1960s, Students for a Democratic Society (SDS) took over where the Liberal Union left off, protesting against the Vietnam War and in favor of organized labor, tenants' rights, and the civil rights movement. Thus, multi-issue organizations have a long history on the Harvard campus and contribute to the school's high level of protest activity.
It is also interesting to note that protest events are more likely to occur in times and places where more economic resources are available. These results are consistent with resource mobilization theory arguments. In addition, protest events were more likely during the 1965-1973 cycle of protest. 22 In the subsequent models I explore whether these results 22. When I run the models without the variable measuring the 1960s cycle of protest, the variable for elite antagonist is positive and highly signi cant in the models predicting any protest event. The 1960s protest cycle variable may be partially capturing the signi cant threat presented by the Vietnam War and by President Nixon's administration and the FBI during the late 1960s and early 1970s. hold true for all types of events, including those involving within-and cross-movement organizational coalition events. The second model presents the results of an analysis of events that did not involve organizational coalitions (see Table 3 , Model 2). It is interesting to note that multi-issue organizations, peace, black, labor and women's organizations are less likely to participate in noncoalition events than are student government organizations and other ethnic student groups (the omitted category). This nding re ects the high frequency of coalition work among these organizations (50 percent of events involving multi-issue organizations were coalition events), and may also re ect the fact that during some time periods and in some locations, student government organizations were the only viable student action group. For example, on the Muhlenberg College campus, the Student Council sponsored most of the protest events, including events organized in opposition to the Vietnam War, in support of civil rights, and in support of the United Farm Workers' lettuce boycott. Non-coalition events are also more likely in times and locations with higher student enrollments and during the 1960s cycle of protest.
Model 3 predicts the likelihood that organizations within a single social movement will stage a protest event together (see Table 3 , Model 3). A variable measuring school economic resources has a signi cant positive effect, suggesting that increased resource availability does facilitate the formation of coalitions within a single social movement (Proposition 1a). This nding is consistent with the idea that plentiful economic resources may lessen interorganizational competition and thereby facilitate collaboration. The activity of multi-issue organizations also increases the likelihood of within-movement coalition events (Proposition 2). The presence of an active multi-issue organization on campus is associated with a 36 percent higher likelihood of a within-movement coalition event occurring at any given point in time.
Multi-issue organizations, black student associations, and organizations formed around peace and labor issues are more likely to participate in within-movement coalitions than are any other organizations. Gay student organizations and political party organizations such as the Young Democrats are signi cantly less likely to participate in a within-movement organizational coalition event. Two factors probably contribute to these results. First, campuses frequently have only one gay organization and one left-oriented political party organization, whereas they may have multiple peace organizations, for example. Second, because multiissue organizations cannot be classi ed as belonging to a single social movement, their participation was not included in the de nition of a cross-movement coalition. Therefore, when multi-issue organizations did work in collaboration with one other organization, I coded it as a within-movement coalition.
The presence of local threats is associated with a higher likelihood of within-movement organizational cooperation (Proposition 3a). The variables measuring a negative college administration response to the previous event and the presence of counter-demonstrators at the previous event are both positive and statistically signi cant. A negative response from the administration increases the likelihood of a within-movement coalition event by 38 percent, and the presence of counter-demonstrators at a previous event increases the likelihood by 46 percent. For example, in October of 1969, SDS joined with the November Action Committee, an anti-war group, to protest Harvard's repression of student and employee activists. The protest was in opposition to three instances of repression: the ring of a graduate student who had participated in the occupation of the administration building the previous spring; the arrest of six SDS members for posting anti-war notices earlier in the month; and, the ring of several University employees allegedly for their political activity. After this event, the University's punishment of protesters continued to inspire student coalitions, one of which lasted for 10 years. In 1980, a coalition of student housing committees voted to continue their boycott, started in 1970, of a disciplinary committee formed by the University to handle actions against student protesters. The presence of an external threat may help groups transcend ideological and identity differences as they seek increased power through collaboration. A federal-level elite enemy, on the other hand, is not associated with a greater likelihood of within-movement coalition events. I discuss these results further below in comparison to the cross-movement coalition results.
The fourth model examines the factors associated with the incidence of cross-movement coalition events (see Table 3 , Model 4). As predicted, the level of economic resources available on campus does not in uence the likelihood of a cross-movement coalition event (Proposition 1b). Thus, competition over resources appears to inhibit within-movement coalition formation but not cross-movement coalition formation. The number of students on campus is signi cant once again, suggesting that a large constituent pool facilitates all forms of protest activity.
Although the past activity of multi-issue movement organizations is not associated with a higher likelihood of a cross-movement coalition event, the results suggest that multi-issue organizations are frequently involved in cross-movement coalitions (Proposition 2). The activities of Harvard's Students for a Democratic Society (SDS) chapter provide an example of this effect. After Harvard's African American Association worked with SDS to protest discriminatory hiring practices in the late 1960s, the group joined SDS and other anti-war groups in protesting against the Vietnam War. Thus, multi-issue movement organizations create links between different movement organizations and play a role in generating protest activity.
Peace, civil rights, anti-apartheid, women's movement, labor and political party organizations are all more likely to participate in cross-movement coalitions than are other campus organizations, including those formed around environmental or non-African American minority rights issues and those formed for non-political reasons including student governance. 23 These results are not surprising given the historical information described earlier. Next I examine whether threats, including the presence of elite antagonists or counterdemonstrators, have a positive impact on the likelihood of cross-movement coalition events. The presence of a Republican antagonist in the White House is associated with higher levels of cross-movement coalition work (Proposition 3b). 24 The presence of an elite antagonist increases the likelihood that a cross-movement coalition event will occur by 42 percent. For example, the election of Ronald Reagan to the White House and the policies that followed during his administration mobilized students across the country. On the day of his election in November 1980, several groups staged a protest at Harvard, including the Harvard-Radcliffe (H-R) Peace Alliance, the H-R Anti-Nuclear Alliance, the Gay Student Association, the South Africa Solidarity Committee, the Feminist Alliance, and the Latin-American Student Association. Speakers called for a coalition to oppose the right, illustrating their recognition of a common foe.
Local threats, including opposition from the administration and the presence of counterdemonstrators, are not associated with a higher likelihood of cross-movement collaboration. This nding suggests that it takes a broader enemy, such as the federal executive, to inspire cross-movement coalition work, while more local threats inspire within-movement mobilization.
Qualitative evidence from Harvard suggests that a negative response from the university administration sometimes does inspire cross-movement mobilization, but it is possible that these events tend to occur during periods of generally high mobilization or in response to more distant events. 25 For example, in the spring of 1969, several hundred Harvard SDS 23. I did not code events involving a multi-issue organization and one other organization as a cross-movement coalition event, and this may explain the small coef cient for multi-issue organizations in Model 4.
24. The variable measuring elite antagonist reaches a higher level of statistical signi cance (p , .01) when I remove the variable measuring the 1960s cycle of protest. As I mention in footnote 22, the protest cycle variable may be partially capturing the effect of an elite antagonist.
25. I ran models including interaction terms between a negative administrative response and the years 1969 and 1970, the peak of the 1960s protest wave, and the coef cient was positive and neared statistical signi cance. supporters took over the administration building in pursuit of several goals, including the abolition of ROTC on campus, rent control, and curbs on Harvard's development plans. College of cials responded by calling in the police, who staged a surprise raid early the next morning. The police beat numerous students, and 250-300 students were arrested. The crackdown mobilized the entire campus, leading to a student strike that lasted for ten days. Numerous student organizations supported the strike and the demands put forward by SDS, including the School of Education, the Association of African and Afro-American Students, Law School Students, the Committee for Radical Structural Reform, and the Graduate School of Design. The persecution of student activists was an issue that cut across all movements and affected a broad identity category. The killings at Kent State and Jackson State in 1970 similarly mobilized a vast array of student movement organizations, because the deaths of student protesters were an issue that cut across movement boundaries. This qualitative evidence suggests that more research is needed before we will fully understand the mobilizing role of threat.
Contrary to my hypothesis, high levels of protest activity do not lead to a greater likelihood of cross-movement coalition events, as the variable measuring the 1960s cycle of protest is not signi cant (Proposition 4). However, my second temporal proposition, that a recent cross-movement coalition event makes subsequent cross-movement events more likely, is supported (Proposition 5). A recent cross-movement coalition event increases the likelihood that another cross-movement event will occur by 34 percent. For example, following the cross-movement protests of Reagan's election in 1980, a diverse set of organizations continued to work together, protesting against U.S. involvement in Central America and nuclear weapons, and rallying in support of the Equal Rights Amendment. In April of that school year, six organizations joined a protest against Apartheid, including the South Africa Solidarity Committee, the H-R Peace Alliance, Gays Organized in Opposition to Discrimination, La Organización, the Third World Center Organization, and the Black Students Association. It is interesting to note that in contrast, recent cross-movement events actually reduce the likelihood of a within-movement coalition event. These results suggest that cross-movement interactions increase the ties between different movement organizations, potentially expanding their ideological focus and agenda, and inspiring them to continue working in collaboration rather than retreating back to a single-issue focus.
Conclusions: Conditions for Cross-Movement Coalition Formation
One of the few ways that social movements can demonstrate their power is by mobilizing large numbers of participants. Organizational coalitions facilitate mass mobilizations but carry with them costs and barriers that organizations may be unable or unwilling to overcome. This research demonstrates that external threats and the presence of multi-issue organizations help them do so. Plentiful resources and local adversaries facilitate the formation of within-movement coalitions, while larger threats inspire cross-movement coalitions. Multi-issue organizations foster increased coalition work of all kinds, and contribute to overall levels of mobilization. This is one of the rst studies to examine the conditions under which movements are able to establish broad coalitions that cross movement boundaries.
This research suggests that threat may be an important mobilizing condition. Research within the resource mobilization/political opportunity tradition emphasizes the mobilizing effect of political opportunities, but my research shows that political threats also inspire protest. Local threats, including a negative response from institutional authorities (the administration) and counter-demonstrators, inspire within-movement coalition work but not crossmovement coalitions or non-coalition protest. More powerful enemies in the form of an antagonistic federal administration inspire cross-movement coalition activity. Ronald Reagan's administration during the 1980s fostered cross-movement coalitions by presenting threats to blacks, gays, and those concerned with peace and international human rights. Although the threats presented by corporate entities were not analyzed in the quantitative analysis, a close reading of the qualitative evidence suggests that the Coors Brewing Company similarly mobilized multiple constituencies by discriminating against blacks and gays. These ndings suggest that it takes a bigger enemy to inspire cooperation across movement lines but that local threats can inspire within-movement collaboration. Subsequent research should further explore the mobilizing effect of threat.
This research makes an important contribution by demonstrating that organizational goals and ideology in uence action. Research on the relationship between organizational form and strategic action tends to focus on how bureaucratic structure (e.g., formal versus informal) in uences tactic selection. However, the nding that cross-movement coalitions are facilitated by the activity of multi-issue movement organizations demonstrates that ideology is a crucial organizational dimension. In different time periods, SDS and the Democratic Socialists were active on multiple campuses on a variety of issues, working with many different movement organizations. These multi-issue organizations created connections between different groups and issues, fostering increased within-and cross-movement coalition work. The presence of organizations that pursue action based on a broad ideology has a positive effect not only on the incidence of coalition events but also on overall levels of protest. The continual presence of active multi-issue organizations on the Harvard University campus may help explain the relatively high levels of protest seen on that campus. Levels of mobilization are a key component of social movement power, and it appears that organizations with a multi-issue ideology help generate this power.
This study suggests that resource availability may be more crucial to within-movement coalitions than it is to cross-movement alliances. Collaboration between organizations within the same social movement is more likely given plentiful resources, both economic and in terms of personnel. Plentiful resources may facilitate within-movement collaboration because they reduce inter-organizational competition. Resource availability may not have a signi cant effect on the likelihood of cross-movement coalition events because organizations formed around different issues do not compete with one another for resources to the same extent. Participants, however, are one resource that all organizations require. Consistent with prior research, protest of all forms was more likely when student enrollments were higher.
The research design employed here is limited in its focus on college student protest activity. It is possible that the dynamics of college student protest differ from non-student protests. Unique features of the campus situation may both facilitate and hinder coalition formation. The college student population is continually changing, a feature that may present an obstacle to sustained coalition work. On the other hand, the college campus is a limited geographical area in which organizations and activists are likely to interact, facilitating the formation of cross-organizational ties. Students are a relatively homogenous population demographically and therefore may share identities that also facilitate coalition work. The extent to which these ndings would explain the activity of social movement organizations within other settings is a question for further study.
It is important, however, to remember that students are a highly active population and have played an important role in most major social movements. For example, student chapters of the NAACP and other college campus groups played a vital role in the lunch counter sit-ins that sparked the mass mobilization of the civil rights movement in the early 1960s. A recent study found that students participated in over 33 percent of the protest events reported in The New York Times between 1968 (Van Dyke, Soule, and McCarthy 2001 . Given the high level of involvement of students and student organizations in many major social movements, a study of their coalitions is worthwhile. In addition, research shows that students and their organizations tend to use more confrontational tactics than do other constituencies and organizations (Van Dyke, Soule, and McCarthy 2001) . Because organizations and movements that use confrontational tactics tend to be more successful (Gamson 1990 ), these student groups play a critical role in efforts at social change. Understanding the dynamics of student protest illuminates important processes involved in many modern social movements.
This research is one of the rst studies of the factors that facilitate broad social movement coalitions. Scholars and activists have argued for years that broad ideologies and the pursuit of action on multiple fronts are necessary to overcome the fragmentation that has hampered the left's efforts at social change, but they have had little empirical research to support their claims. These ndings demonstrate that multi-issue movement organizations, threats produced by local and national elites, and issues that cut across movement boundaries facilitate cross-movement coalition events. Uni ed action is facilitated by organizations with a broad ideological orientation, and by a focus on large, national or international, adversaries.
These ndings also help us understand features of the current political landscape. The protests against the World Trade Organization (WTO) in December of 1999 in Seattle involved arguably the largest cross-movement organizational coalition ever seen, with over 500 participating organizations (Greenhouse 1999) . Labor, environmental, human rights, women's rights, and a host of other organizations joined the event. As the current study suggests, the nature of the WTO facilitated the formation of this large coalition. The fact that international organizations are not accountable to any constituency through elections or other means makes them threatening to a vast array of groups. The broad scope of international decisionmaking includes issues related to the environment, human rights, and labor, to name only a few. While globalization and international governing bodies such as the WTO may represent a loss of control on the part of local citizens, they also present a target for cooperation and common mobilization. This research suggests we will continue to see broad coalitions engaging in protest around these international issues and governing bodies. 
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